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ABSTRACT
Blockchain systems are designed to produce blocks at a constant aver-
age rate. e most popular systems currently employ a Proof of Work
(PoW) algorithm as a means of creating these blocks. An unfortunate
limitation of all deployed PoW blockchain systems is that the time
between blocks has high variance. For example, Bitcoin produces,
on average, one block every 10 minutes. However, 5% of the time,
Bitcoin’s inter-block time is at least 40 minutes.
In this paper, we show that high variance is at the root of several
fundamental aacks on PoW blockchains. We propose an alternative
process for PoW-based block discovery that results in an inter-block
time with signicantly lower variance. Our algorithm, called Bobtail,
generalizes the current algorithm by comparing the mean of the
k-lowest order statistics to a target. We show that the variance of inter-
block times decreases as k increases. Bobtail signicantly thwarts
doublespend and selsh mining aacks, and makes detection of eclipse
aacks trivial and quick. For example, for Bitcoin and Ethereum, a
doublespending aacker with 40% of the mining power will succeed
with 53% probability when the merchant sets up an embargo of 1 block;
however, when k ≥ 40, the probability of success for the same aacker
falls to less than 1%. Similarly, for Bitcoin and Ethereum currently, a
selsh miner with 49% of the mining power will claim about 95% of
blocks; however, when k ≥ 20, the same miner will nd that selsh
mining is less successful than honest mining. We also investigate
aacks newly made possible by Bobtail and show how they can be
defeated. e primary costs of our approach are larger blocks and
increased network trac.
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain systems are designed to produce blocks at a constant
average rate. e most popular systems currently employ a Proof
of Work (PoW) algorithm as a means of creating these blocks [1],
including Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin Core, Ethereum [2], and Litecoin [3].
For example, Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash produce one block every 10
minutes on average and self-adjust the diculty of producing a
block if too many or too few have been produced. Unfortunately, a
limitation of all deployed PoW blockchain systems is that the time
between blocks has high variance and the distribution of inter-block
times has a very long tail. For example, 5% of the time, Bitcoin’s
inter-block time is at least 40 minutes. As we show, high variance
enables doublespend [1, 4] and selshmining [5] aacks, in addition
to impeding the consistent ow of validated transactions through
the system.
e high variance of inter-block times is a direct consequence
of PoW algorithms. Generally, miners in all deployed systems cra
blocks by repeatedly changing a nonce in the block header until
the hash of that header is less than a target value t . In other words,
the hash of each header is a sample taken randomly from a discrete
uniform distribution that ranges between [0, S], where S = 2b − 1
and typically b = 256. A block is discovered when the rst order
statistic (i.e., the minimum value) of all sampled values is less than
target t , 0 < t < S .
In this paper, we show that high variance is at the root of several
fundamental aacks on PoW blockchains, including doublespend
and selsh mining aacks. We propose an alternative process for
PoW-based block discovery that results in an inter-block time with
signicantly lower variance. Our algorithm generalizes the current
algorithm by comparing the mean of the k-lowest order statistics to
a target. We show that the variance of inter-block times decreases
as k increases. For example, if our approach were applied to Bitcoin,
nearly every block would be found within 5 to 18 minutes; and the
average inter-block time would remain at 10 minutes. As a result,
doublespend and selsh mining aack ecacies are drastically
reduced. e cost of our approach is larger blocks and increased
network trac. New aacks are possible, but we show how they
can be thwarted. We call our approach Bobtail mining.
Problem Statement.
Imagine that the mining process is carried out for exactly h
hashes during time interval I , generating hash values H1, . . . ,Hh
from [0, S] uniformly at random. Now dene Vi to be the value
of the ith order statistic at the end of I , i.e. Vi = H(i) in standard
notation. LetWk be a random variable representing the average
value over the lowest k order statistics aer h hashes.
Wk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
Vi . (1)
Wk constitutes the collective mining proof (proof, for short) for
the entire network. Our Bobtail mining criterion says that a new
block is discovered when a realized value ofWk meets the target t :
wk ≤ t . (2)
Notably, this approach is a generalization of current systems, which
are the special case where k = 1.
Our primary goals are therefore to show, given values of k > 1,
that: (i) there is a signicantly reduced inter-block time variance;
(ii) the costs are relatively small, which include increases in block
size and network trac; (iii) selsh mining and doublespend aacks
are signicantly more dicult to carry out as k increases; and (iv)
that new aacks made possible by seing k > 1 are easily mitigated.
Contributions.
• We derive the statistical characteristics of our approach
and validate each empirically. For example, we derive ex-
pressions for the expectation and variance of the Bobtail
mining proof and the number of hashes performed for any
value of k . Using these expressions, we quantify the reduc-
tion in variance of inter-block time expected for values of
k > 1.
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• We show that variance in block discovery time is reduced
by O(1/i) when using k = i order statistics relative to the
variance when k = 1 (the status quo).
• We show that Bobtail mining results in a lower rate of
orphaned blocks.
• We demonstrate that low-variance mining signicantly
mitigates the threats to security posed by selsh mining
and doublespend aacks. For Bitcoin and Ethereum cur-
rently (i.e., when k = 1), an aacker with 40% of the min-
ing power will succeed with 30% probability when the
merchant sets up an embargo of 8 blocks; however, when
k ≥ 20, the probability of success falls to less than 1%. Sim-
ilarly, for Bitcoin and Ethereum currently, a selsh miner
with 45% of the mining power will claim about 95% of
blocks; however, when k ≥ 20, the same miner will nd
that selsh mining is less successful than honest mining.
• We show that new intra-block withholding aacks are
possible for Bobtail. However, by carefully designing a
rewards scheme for mining, these aacks are mitigated.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our approach is related to previous results in proof-of-work, cryp-
tographic puzzles, and improvements to blockchain architectures.
Proof of work. A large number of papers have explored applica-
tions of proof-of-work. Dwork and Naor [6] rst suggested proof-
of-work (PoW) in 1992, applying it as a method to thwart spam
email. A number of subsequent works similarly applied PoW to
thwarting denial-of-service (DoS) aacks [7–12]. Our approach can
be adopted into many of these past works to improve computational
variance. Jakobsson and Juels [13] and Jules and Brainerd [14] ex-
amine the security properties of PoW protocols, and base their
theorems on the average work required; our approach would pro-
vide stronger guarantees under their theorems since the variance
is lower. Laurie and Clayton [15] examine the practical limitations
in deploying PoW solutions in DoS scenarios.
Douceur [16] noted in 2002 that proofs of work canmitigate Sybil
aacks. Also in 2002, Back [17] applied PoW to cryptocurrencies.
Back noted the high variance of computational PoW and regarded
it as an open problem. Nakamoto’s Bitcoin [1] built on these ideas.
In 2003, Abadi et al. [18] suggested memory-bound functions
as a beer foundation for avoiding the variance in CPU resources
among users. Indeed, the ETHASH [19] PoW algorithm in Ether-
eum [2] adopted a PoW function that requires more memory than
is economically protable for custom ASICSs. In contrast, our goal
is to reduce the variance of the entire network’s time to solve a
PoW problem, and it is not to increase egalitarianism or increase
participation by eschewing specialized hardware. In any case, our
approach is applicable to ETHASH.
Coelho [20] is the work is closest to ours in terms of goals. at
work proposes a PoW puzzle based on Merkle trees that requires an
exact number of steps and therefore has no computational variance.
Without variance, the same miner would always win, and therefore
the method is unsuitable for blockchains.
Bitcoin-NG [21] also oers low-variance transaction announce-
ments via PoW-based leader election. However, because inter-leader
time variance would still be from an exponential distribution, unlike
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Figure 1: Bobtail blocks are a superset of existing PoW schemes.
They contain a link to a prior block, a timestamp, the current dii-
culty, and the Merkle root of a set of transactions; they also add
proof sets contributed by other miners as well as bounties that
prove claims about individual proof sets.
Bobtail, Bitcoin-NG does not reduce doublespend, selsh mining,
or eclipse aack vulnerability. Furthermore, unlike our approach,
Bitcoin-NG sets up the elected leader as a single point of failure.
Blockchains without PoW. Several newer blockchains are not
based on computational proof of work, and our solution does
not apply to them. ese include proof-of-storage [22], proof-of-
stake [23, 24], and blockless [25] schemes. However, almost all
wealth stored in cryptocurrencies are in computational PoW block-
chains that our approach does apply to, including Bitcoin, Bitcoin
Cash, Litecoin, Ethereum, and Ethereum Classic.
3 PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide a high-level overview of the Bobtail
protocol and its fundamental features.
Blocks. Bobtail blocks, illustrated in Figure 1, consist of a block
header H , a set T1 of valid, previously unconrmed transactions,
a proof package K , bounties B, and a signature S. Block header
H contains the same elds as a conventional block header such as
the one used in Bitcoin or Ethereum, and three additional elds,
which are described below. Proof package K is a collection of k
proof sets, where each proof set Pi contains a payout address for
the miner, values necessary for creating valid proof of work, and
other values used for thwarting aacks. Proof sets are hashed to
create PoW, i.e. h(Pi ) = Vi . e sets are ranked so thatV1 is dened
as the smallest value or rst order statistic (1OS, for short). Each
bounty B(T ,T) ∈ B is a Merkle proof that some transactionT is in
T for some transaction set T ∈ {T1, . . . ,Tk }; it is used to prevent
doublespend aacks as we describe in detail below. Finally, S is
the signature ofH and it must be generated with the private key
that matches the payout address in Pi .
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Mining. Bobtail mining is a generalization of the procedure imple-
mented in conventional PoW blockchains. Each miner seeks to re-
ceive coinbase reward by becoming one of the k proof sets included
in K = [P1, . . . ,Pk ]. Proof set Pi has elds (o,mi ,ai , si ,Ni ),
where o is the hash of the previous block header, mi is the root
of a Merkle tree containing transactions Ti , ai is the miner’s pay-
out address, si is the supporting proof for Pi , and Ni = h(Ni ),
the nonce. In contrast to typical PoW systems, the nonce is more
than just a random number; it contains values that can be omit-
ted from the blockchain for all proofs except the 1OS. Speci-
cally, Ni = (v,d, ei ,ni , . . .), where v is protocol version, d is cur-
rent diculty, ei is a timestamp, ni is a nonce, and we allow
zero or more optional arguments. Finally, header H has elds
(v,o,d, e,N1,m1, s1,p,b), where e is a timestamp, p is the root of a
Merkle tree containing every Vi corresponding to Pi ∈ K , b is the
root of a Merkle tree containing h(B(T ,T )) for each B(T ,T ) ∈ B,
and the remaining elds match the corresponding values from P1.
Like other PoW blockchains, miners select new nonces and gen-
erate proofs continuously. In Section 6, we show how a miner can
precisely determine the probability that any given proof will even-
tually be included in the mining package. Once a proof is discovered
having sucient probability of inclusion, the corresponding values
H , Pi , and Ti are propagated. Because of their large size and high
degree of redundancy, transaction sets Ti can be propagated using
Graphene [26] or the weak block protocol [27] to greatly reduce
associated network overhead.
e diculty d for each block is adjusted roughly once every
two weeks using the same algorithm deployed in Bitcoin1. In short,
the mean block time for the last 2016 blocks is used to estimate
the actual diculty at which the miners were operating; then the
diculty is adjusted up or down in order to ensure that the expected
block time is 10 minutes if miners continuing mining at the same
rate. At a given diculty d , the target t is derived from d in the
same manner that it is for Bitcoin2, which involves translating
integer d into a threshold 256-bit arithmetic value (i.e., one that
supports arithmetic operations). We say that a block is assembled
when (i) the mean of the k proofs, V1, . . .Vk , is less than or equal
to t ; (ii) the package is signed by the miner who generated the 1OS
using address a1; (iii) supports s2, . . . sk are greater than or equal
to V1.
e coinbase transaction of the block creates new coin that is dis-
tributed to addresses a1, . . . ,ak according to the scheme described
in Section 8. If the coinbase of the new block does not contain
the correctly awarded coinbase, then the block is ignored by other
miners. e assembled block, comprised of H , T1, K , B, and S
is propagated throughout the network. Receivers validate that S
was generated by hashingH with the private key corresponding
to payout address a1. ey also validate T1, K , and B againstH . If
validation succeeds, then the block is added to the blockchain.
Bounties Bobtail employs a bounty system to disincentivize the
use of incompatible transactions (those spending the same UTXO)
in transactions sets Ti . Bounty B(Ti ,T ′) contains a Merkle proof
that transaction set Ti contains transaction T ′. e Merkle proof
1hps://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/78dae8caccd82cfbfd76557f1fb7d7557c7b5edb/
src/pow.cpp#L49
2hps://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/78dae8caccd82cfbfd76557f1fb7d7557c7b5edb/
src/pow.cpp#L80
is simply all nodes along a path from the Merkle root mi to the
leaf containing T ′. When proof set Pi is disseminated in the net-
work, it must be accompanied by Merkle rootmi and associated
transactions Ti . e recipient checks that the transactions in Ti are
compatible with the transactions in her own set Tj . If she discov-
ers incompatible transaction T ′ ∈ Ti , then she can create bounty
B(Ti ,T ′). Later, if one of her proofs is the 1OS, she will include all
bounties that implicate transactions in conict with T1.
Fork-choice rule. If multiple miners generate proofs with value
low enough to mine a block with the same parent, then there can
arise ambiguity over which extends the main chain, i.e. the chain
that honest miners will continue to extend. To avoid this ambigu-
ity, we dene the main chain to be the one comprising the most
aggregate work, from the genesis block up to the tip; all competing
chains are orphaned, i.e. ignored by honest miners. Aggregate work
is calculated as the sum of inferred hashes, S/wk , over each block,
where S is the size of the hash space and wk is the value of the
mining statistic. In general, this fork-choice rule ensure that blocks
with lower average proof values will be favored over those with
higher values. Note that because proof sets reference a specic
parent block, they can only be shared between child blocks having
the same parent. And according to our fork-choice rule, ultimately
the child block with the lowest valuewk will extend the main chain.
Additional rules. In order to reduce the number of orphaned
blocks (discussed in Section 7.1) and thwart various aacks (see
Section 4), minerM will adhere to the following rules. (i)M rejects
proof package K if V1 is higher than the lowest proof she has seen
announced on the network. (ii)When assembling a proof package
as author of the 1OS,M will include proofs from other miners in
the same order she received them from the network. Specically,
M begins by identifying all sets of k proofs S1, . . ., each with mean
value below t . Let r be the maximum reward value, across all Si ,
that would be returned toM if the the given set was assembled into
a block. She discards any sets that do not return reward value r ,
and then assembles the proof package from the remaining set with
the earliest average proof receipt time.
4 THREAT MODEL
Doublespend and selsh mining. Doublespend [1, 4] and self-
ing mining [5] aacks are the two most fundamental aacks on
blockchains [28, 29]. In both, aackers aempt to mine a fork of the
blockchain that is longer than the honest miners’ branch. Because
the aacker is assumed to have a minority of the mining power, in
expectation, the aacker cannot create a longer branch than that
of the honest miners. However, just like a person visiting a casino,
the aacker is seeking a short-term win. He is aempting to get
lucky and nd a series of blocks quickly while the honest miners
are relatively unlucky and discover blocks slowly, despite the larger
amount of mining power. Intuitively the success of the aacks lies
in leveraging the inherent variance of mining.
Proof withholding. A proof withholding aack is unique to Bob-
tail and involves miner A declining to publish some subset of her
proofs immediately aer they are generated. Instead, A withholds
the proofs in order to gain an informational advantage over the
remaining miners, M . While A sees all proofs, an honest miner in
M sees only proofs generated by members ofM . A hopes that this
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advantage will allow her to assemble some proof packages with
more than her fair share of proofs and ultimately lead to an increase
in her total reward.
Zero-cost zero-conrmation (ZCZC) doublespend. When car-
rying out a zero-conrmation doublespend aack, the aacker
seeks to displace payment transactionT with an incompatible trans-
action T ′, which spends the same UTXO. e ZCZC doublespend
is a variant of the conventional aack where the aacker reuses
proofs between multiple branches of the blockchain to this end. To
do so, he releases payment transaction T to a merchant and the
Bitcoin network at large. Simultaneously he mines with transaction
set Tj containing T ′. If he is lucky enough to mine the 1OS, then
j = 1, Tj becomes the canonical transaction set for the block, T ′
is conrmed, and the merchant payment is negated. But even if
he does not mine the 1OS, he can release his proofs containing Tj
at some point before the block is mined and still receive a reward
for those that are included in the proof package. Note that this
aack also applies to doublespends where the aacker aempts to
produce a competing branch of arbitrary length z, however, proofs
can only be reused during the creation of the rst block on the
competing branch.
Denial-of-reward. It is possible for an aacking peer in the net-
work to cheaply weaponize the bounty process against miners.
Suppose that peer A creates incompatible transactions T and T ′
such that both spend the same UTXO. Suppose further that she
disseminates T to roughly half the miners and T ′ to the remaining
miners. en, it is likely that the rst group of miners will regard
T as a legitimate transaction and T ′ as a doublespend, while the
opposite would be true for the other miners. us, in expectation,
roughly half the proofs will use a transaction set containing T and
half will use a transaction set containing T ′. Furthermore, miners
will construct bounties for whichever transaction they believe to
be a doublespend. Eventually, a proof package will be assembled
(containing transaction set T1) by one of the minersM , who holds
the 1OS. Assume, without loss of generality, that T1 contains T .
en minerM is incentivized to include all bounties against proofs
whose Merkle trees contain T ′. As a result, the miners of those
proofs, roughly half the total in expectation, will lose their reward.
5 PROPERTIES OF THE K-OS CRITERION
Recall from Section 1 that Vi represents the ith lowest hash value
achieved aer h hashes are performed during interval I . Next,
dene Xi to be the number of hash intervals required for the ith
order statistic to fall below target v when h hashes are performed
per interval. In Appendix A we show that Vi and Xi are gamma
distributed with shape parameter i , only diering in scale parameter.
Specically, Vi ∼ Gamma(t ; i,v) and Xi ∼ Gamma(x ; i, 1/r ) where v
is the expected value of the minimum hash during interval I , and r
is the rate at which hashes are generated below v during interval I .
e two parameters are further shown to be related by the following
equation
v = r
S
h
. (3)
5.1 Target Adjustment
Assuming ideal diculty adjustment, the mining target tk cor-
responding to mining statisticWk is set so that tk = E[Wk ]. In
Appendix A, we denedv as the value of the minimum hash during
interval I , which implies that v = E[W1] = t1. at is to say, when
k = 1, the target is equal to v . But this same target will produce
later blocks for k > 1 becauseWj includes higher order statistics
thanWi when j > i , meaning that the network must produce more
hashes in expectation in order forWj to achieve the same value
asWi . erefore, the goal in this section is to determine how to
select tk as a function of v such that the number of hash intervals
required to ensure E[W1] < v is the same as the number required
to ensure E[Wk ] < tk .
To that end, we begin by deriving an expression for the expected
number of hash intervals required forWk to fall below target tk ,
which we nd is easiest to determine relative to a slightly dierent
statistic. e sample average of the Xi (analogous toWk ) is an
obvious candidate, however, it actually gives the average number
of intervals required for each order statistic Vi to independently
fall below value v given that h hashes are performed during each
interval. Naturally, more intervals are required as i increases be-
cause larger order statistics have higher expected value. So what
we would like is to tune each Xi so that they are all expected to
nish at the same time.
Recall from Appendix A that E[Xi ] = ir . us, by dividing each
Xi by i we can align the Xi to share the same expected value. To
that end, dene the normalized hash interval count by X ′i = Xi/i;
and analogously dene V ′i = Vi/i . Each X ′i is interpreted as the
number of hash intervals required for Vi to fall below iv (or for V ′i
to fall below v). We have E[X ′i ] = 1r for all i ≥ 1, which implies
that if we tune the hash threshold to be iv forVi , then we expect all
Vi to cross below their threshold aer 1/r hash intervals.
THEOREM 1: In expectation, 1/r hash intervals are required
to ensure that Vi/i < v for all i .
e following result is also straightforward.
THEOREM 2: e expected value ofWk is
E[Wk ] =
k + 1
2 v
PROOF:
E[Wk ] = E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
Vi
]
= 1k
k∑
i=1
E [Vi ]
= 1k
k∑
i=1
iv
= k+12 v .
(4)
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And fromeorem 2 it follows that
E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
V ′i
]
= 1k
k∑
i=1
E
[
V ′i
]
= v
= E[W1]
= 2k+1E[Wk ].
(5)
Equation 5 implies that the expected sample average of valuesV ′i is
equivalent to the expected value ofW1, which is in turn equivalent
to scaling the expected value ofWk by a factor of 2/(k+1). Recalling
that ti = E[Wi ] when targets are tuned optimally, eorem 1 and
Equation 5 give us the following.
THEOREM 3: In expectation, the same number of hash inter-
vals are required to ensureWk < tk , for all k > 0, provided
that tk is chosen such that
tk =
k + 1
2 v . (6)
5.2 Estimating Hash Rate
Because Vi and Xi have the same distribution, up to a change of
variables, Equation 5 also implies
E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
Xi
]
= k+12
1
r
= k+12 E
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
X ′i
]
.
(7)
erefore, assuming that targets have been adjusted so that tk =
k+1
2 v , the following is a natural choice of estimator for the overall
number of hash intervals required to ensureWk < tk .
Yk =
2
k + 1
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
Xi
)
. (8)
Note that the estimator Yk holds the property
2
k + 1E[Wk ] = E[W1] = v = vrE[Y1] = vrE[Yk ].
In other words, E[Wk ] is related to E[Yk ] by the constant transfor-
mation 2vr (k+1) . Equation 7 shows that Yk is the sample average
of random variables X ′i , each representing the number of hash
intervals required for Vi to fall below iv . On the other hand, eo-
rem 1 establishes that E[Vi ] = iv aer mining for 1/r hash intervals.
erefore, Yk is biased to the extent that the sample average of the
Vi ’s deviates from its expected value. But as k increases, the law of
large numbers ensures that individual departures from the mean
for each Vi are cancelled out. us Yk is a consistent estimator
in the limit that k approaches innity. From this argument and
Equations 7 and 8 we have the following.
THEOREM 4: Assuming that tk =
v(k+1)
2 , Yk is a consistent
estimator of the expected number of hash intervals required for
Wk to fall below tk with
E[Yk ] =
1
r
, (9)
where r = vh/S .
5.3 Improvement in Variance
We next turn our aention to quantifying the improvement in
mining time variance that is realized by using the k-OS criterion
over the 1-OS criterion. In Section 5.2 we established that statistic
Yk is a consistent estimator of the number of hash intervals required
for mining statisticWk to fall below target tk = k+12 v . Here we
measure the change in variance of Yk as k increases, while holding
its expected value constant.
THEOREM 5: For xed expected block discovery time, vari-
ance decreases by fraction 8k+46(k2+k ) = O
(
1
k
)
when using mining
statisticWk instead ofW1.
PROOF: eorem 4 establishes that block discovery time Yk is
the same in expectation for all mining statisticsWk provided that
tk =
v(k+1)
2 . erefore, the ratio of variance in Yk to the variance
in Y1 estimates the reduction in block time variance due to Bobtail.
Var [Yk ]
Var [Y1] =
Var
[
2
k+1
(
1
k
∑k
i=1 Xi
)]
Var [X1]
= 4(k+1)2
Var
[(
1
k
∑k
i=1 Xi
)]
Var [X1]
= 4(k+1)2
(k+1)(2k+1)
6k
= 8k+46(k2+k )
= O
(
1
k
)
,
(10)
where we use the expression for Var
[(
1
k
∑k
i=1 Xi
)]
derived in
Appendix 5. 2
Figure 2 shows the distribution ofYk when tk = v(k+1)/2 so that
E[Yk ] = E[Y1]. e plot shows the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) based on the results of a Monte Carlo simulation3. As the
plots illustrate, the use of Bobtail mining results in a signicant
decrease in variance for discovering new blocks.
6 NETWORK OVERHEAD
When the mining criterion isWk , k  1, it is not ecient for each
miner to send proof of work every time she nds a hash value lower
than her previous best. A slight improvement to that scheme is for
her to send proof of work only when her hash value is lower than
the lowest k hashes produced by all miners cumulatively. But even
this approachwill result in a large amount of network trac early in
the mining process because hash values are generated uniformly at
random throughout the mining interval (see eorem 7); therefore
the k lowest are unlikely to be generated in a short period of time
at the beginning.
To improve network eciency signicantly we require that min-
ers do not send or forward proof sets unless there is a high probabil-
ity that the resulting proof will be part of the next block. To create
such a lter, we nd the largest proof value that has a probability p
3We will release all simulation source code used in this paper at camera ready.
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Figure 2: Results of a Monte Carlo simulation showing the CDF of
Yk , the block discovery time under mining statistic Wk , where k
varies for each curve and target tk is chosen so that E[Yk ] = E[Y1].
Each plot’s x-axis is shown in terms of the minutes per block for
Bitcoin (boomaxis) and seconds per block for Ethereum (top axis).
of being part of the block given k ; where typically, p = 0.999999.
e following theorem lets us determine the expected number of
proofs forwarded per block.
THEOREM 6: For a given threshold probability p, the number
of proofs announced to the network isy = Quantile-Gamma(p;k, 1).
PROOF:We know fromeorem 9 that the kth order statistic Vk
has distribution Gamma(k,v). Let
G(x ;k,v) = P(Vk ≤ x) = p
be the CDF ofVk andG−1(p;k,v) be equal to Quantile-Gamma(p;k,v),
which returns x , the value for whichG(x ;k,v) = p. Note from Eq. 3
that v = S/h when tk is tuned for blocks to be generated in time
I (i.e. r = 1). We expect h hashes per block interval, and each
has probability x/S of being below the threshold. erefore, the
random variable representing the number of proofs forwarded by
all miners follows distribution Binomial(n = h,p = x/S), which
has expectation:
hx
S
=
1
v
· Quantile-Gamma(p;k,v)
= Quantile-Gamma(p;k,v/v)
= Quantile-Gamma(p;k, 1) (11)
2
Notably, the value is quite low, and it is independent of h the ex-
pected number of hashes required to mine a block and the size of the
hash space, S . We can also use a Cherno bound for the binomial
distribution to bound the deviation in the number of messagesM .
Let y = hxS where x = G
−1(p;k,v) as dened in the proof above.
P(M ≥ (1 + ϵ)y) ≤ e −yϵ
2
2+ϵ (12)
is is a tight bound, and it decreases exponentially with y and
similarly with k . For example, when k = 2 and p = 0.999999, then
y ≈ 16.7, and we see that P(M > 1.9y) ≤ 0.0095. For k = 3, the
probability decreases to 0.004, and so on.
7 INCREASING CONSENSUS
Even when all miners operate honestly, current blockchain systems
frequently suer from orphaned blocks during their operation that
diminish security and delay consensus. Orphans are generated
when the announcement of a new block by one miner takes time
to propagate to all other miners. In the interim, a second miner
may produce a valid block. At that point, the subset of miners
who received the rst block rst will aempt to build upon it, and
the remaining miners will build upon the second. Eventually the
blockchain will fork on just one of those blocks, orphaning the
other. If the set of transactions in the two blocks is not the same,
then consensus is delayed. While the occurrence of orphans in
Bitcoin is relatively low, Ethereum’s use of a 15 second average
block discovery time increases its orphan rate signicantly.
In Appendix A, we show thatXi , the number of block intervals re-
quired to mine the ith order statistic, has distribution Gamma(i, 1/r ),
where r is the rate at which hashes are generated below the target.
It follows that X1 represents the block inter-arrival time, and it has
distribution Exponential(1/r ) = Exponential(T ), where T is the
expected block time. erefore, in existing PoW blockchains, the
probability that one or more other blocks will be discovered during
propagation time τ is bounded by 1 − 1
eτ /T . Note that this bound
is pessimistic in that it assumes the worst case scenario where the
author of the rst block has a negligible percentage of the total
network hash rate.
In this section, we examine the orphan rate associated with
Bobtail mining compared to Bitcoin and Ethereum. We show that
when miners follow the Bobtail protocol, orphans are strictly less
likely.
7.1 Orphan Prevention Measures
e principal cause of orphans in Bobtail is the fact that, once more
than k proofs have been disseminated, there exist a combinatorial
number of k-element subsets of those proofs. us at the time when
there exists some subset of k proofs whose mean falls below target
t , there is a reasonable chance that some other subset also exists
(or will exist relatively soon). Fortunately, the proof package rules
introduced in Section 3 greatly reduce the number of valid subsets.
First, all proofs must be tethered to a supporting proof, the laer
of which should be the smallest proof previously received by the
miner. Second, no support in the proof package can have value less
than the 1OS. And third, the block must be signed by the private
key used to generate the 1OS.
Together, these conditions ensure that if at least one of the k
proof sets in the proof package points to the 1OS as support (ex-
cluding the 1OS itself), then the creator of the 1OS is the only miner
capable of assembling that proof package. Conversely, although
another miner, say the one who generated V2, might be capable of
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Figure 3: A simulation of Bobtail’s orphan rate when proofs and
blocks propagate with constant delay of τ = 10 seconds and the
interblock time is T = 600 seconds. The orphan rate of Bobtail is
at or below the expected orphan rate, 1 − 1/eτ /T for k = 1, which
is shown as a dashed line. Similar results hold for Ethereum where
τ = 5 and T = 15 seconds. Error bars represent a 95% c.i.
collecting a set of proofs that exclude the 1OS but still having mean
below target t , that miner cannot assemble a proof package if even
a single proof set includes the 1OS as support.
7.2 Performance
We ran a discrete event simulator to determine the ecacy of the
orphan prevention measures described in Section 7.1. e simu-
lation includes only honest miners: once it has received a valid
proof package, an honest miner does not release a competing proof
package of its own. We evaluate aacks on Bobtail subsequently.
e simulation generates blocks by repeatedly selecting values
uniformly at random between 0 and 232. e smallest k values
are used as a candidate block given a pre-set target value. e
propagation delay of new proofs and blocks is τ seconds. Once a
block is found, we assume that the authoring miner drops out and
her mining power is replaced by a new honest miner; i.e., the hash
rate does not change. For τ seconds, the miners continue seeking
a new block following the rules in Section 3. For example, if they
nd a block is possible with a higher 1OS, they will not release the
new block.
Figure 3 (le) shows the results for a Bitcoin-like scenario where
the inter-block time is targeted at T = 600 seconds and the propa-
gation delay is t = 10 seconds. e orphan rate for k = 1 follows
the expected Poisson result, shown as a dashed line. e experi-
ment shows that Bobtail has an orphan rate at or below the k = 1
rate, in terms of statistical signicance. Figure 3 (right) shows the
same result for a simulation of Ethereum where τ = 5 and T = 15
seconds, respectively.
8 INCENTIVIZING HONEST BEHAVIOR
WITH REWARDS
In this section, we show that there exists a reward scheme — the pay-
out of fees and coinbase — that incentivizes miners to (i) continue
mining for increased reward (rather than stopping once any proof
is discovered) (ii) use the lowest proof they know of as support, and
(iii) immediately broadcast all suciently low proofs. In this sec-
tion, we evaluate the following reward structure with respect to all
three properties assuming honest miner behavior (aack scenarios
are considered in Section 9).
• To each proof in the proof package, we assign primary
reward R, which is the same for each proof in a given
package, but may vary from block to block.
• To each proof whose support is the 1OS, we award a bonus
reward B, which is again the same for every proof pointing
to the 1OS, but may vary by block.
One of the major goals of this section is to determine the expected
primary and bonus rewards accrued by an honest miner across all
proofs in a given block. We further derive the expected total reward
T , which is the sum of expected primary and bonus rewards for a
miner following the honest strategy.
8.1 Idealized Analysis
We begin with a basic result that is useful in contemplating reward
distribution.
THEOREM 7: In expectation, a fraction x of the mining power
will generate a fraction x of all proofs as well as a fraction x of
the k-lowest order statistics.
PROOF:Without loss of generality, assume a single minerM owns
fraction x of the mining power. All hashes generated are uniformly
distributed throughout space S . erefore, of all the hashes that fall
within an interval of S , minerM will own fraction x . e interval
[0, S] contains all proofs; it is therefore clear thatM will generate
fraction x of all proofs. Moreover, the set of all proofs K that are at
or below the kth order statistic denes an interval, [0,k-OS]. us
M will own fraction x of proofs in K as well, which constitutes
fraction x of the set of lowest k order statistics.
2
We next analyze the reward payout with respect to our desired
mining properties under the assumption that all miners behave
honestly, i.e. according to the protocol. Consider a minerM who
possesses fraction x of the total mining power. According to eo-
rem 7, M can expect to have generated fraction x of the k proofs
in the proof package. erefore,M will earn xkR primary reward
in expectation. e expected bonus reward is straightforward to
calculate as well, but requires the following observation.
THEOREM 8: e rank (i.e., hash value) of a proof is uncor-
related with the time it is generated.
PROOF: LetT = P1, P2, . . . be the set of all proofs generated during
time interval I , and assumewithout loss of generality that the proofs
are ordered chronologically so that Pi was generated before Pj if
i < j . Dene V (P) as the hash value of proof P and let V (T ) denote
the set of all proof values generated during I . It will suce to
show that the conditional probability that Pi achieves a given value
v ∈ V (T ) is uniform for all Pi .
Being drawn from a uniform distribution, we have that P(V (Pi ) =
v) is equal for all proofs Pi . Next deneVv (T ) = V (T ) \ {v}, which
implies P(V (T ) | V (Pi ) = v) = P(Vv (T )) because P(V (Pi )) and
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Figure 4: Everyone is honest. The doed lines show the predicted
value of R and B from Eq. 13.
P(V (Pj )) are independent for i , j. us
P(V (Pi ) = v | V (T )) =
P (V (T ) | V (Pi )=v)P (V (Pi )=v)
P (V (T )) =
P(V (Pi ) = v) P (Vv (T ))P (V (T )) = c
for some constant c. 2
We can use eorem 8 to show that half of a miner’s proofs in
the proof package are expected to be generated aer the 1OS. us
honest minerM , with fraction x of the hash rate, will generate xk2
proofs that use the 1OS as support. It follows that M’s expected
bonus reward is equal to xkB2 . Finally, the expected total reward
for the honest miner is given by
TH = xk
(
R +
B
2
)
. (13)
From this expression for total reward, we can see that honest
mining delivers all three desired mining properties. First, a miner’s
reward is proportional to her hash rate, which encourages her to
mine as much as possible rather than stopping once a proof is found.
Second, her total reward is an increasing function of the number of
her proofs that point to the 1OS. And third, because total reward
is also an increasing function of the number of proofs in the proof
package, she is incentivized to release her proofs as soon as possible
so as to give them greatest chance of being included.
Figure 4 shows the results of this rewards scheme from a simula-
tion of honest miners. e doed lines show the values predicted by
Eq. 13. In the next section, we demonstrate that dishonest miners
earn only fewer rewards.
9 THWARTING ATTACKS
We next demonstrate quantitatively that its reduced inter-block-
time variance allows Bobtail to thwart both doublespend [1] and
selsh mining [5] aacks. We further show that while Bobtail
introduces the possibility of a new proof withholding aack, a simple
protocol policy ensures that aackers receive substantially lower
reward when carrying out this aack.
l l l l l l l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l l l
l
l
l l l l l l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l l l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l l l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l l l l l l ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l l ll
l
l
l
l l
l
k = 20 k = 30 k = 40
k = 1 k = 2 k = 10
0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
merchant's z
Pr
ob
 o
f s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l d
ou
bl
e 
sp
en
d
attacker mining power l l l l l0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.45
Figure 5: Doublespend aack success given k for various values of
aacker mining power (each line) and merchants embargo period
z (on the independent axis). Error bars show 95% c.i.’s.
9.1 Doublespend and Selsh Mining Attacks
Figure 5 shows a Monte Carlo simulation of the doublespend at-
tack. e merchant has setup an embargo period of z blocks. e
aacker’s strategy is to mine until its branch is longer than that of
the honest miners, or until the honest branch is ahead by 3z + 5 (to
ensure that the aack has nite duration). Each facet of the plot
represents a value of k . e results show that as k increases and
variance decreases, the probability of aacker success signicantly
decreases. For example, in today’s implementations of both Bitcoin
and Ethereum, an aacker with 40% of the mining power will suc-
ceed with 30% probability when z = 8; however, using Bobtail with
k ≥ 20, the probability of success falls to less than 1%.
Figure 6 shows a similar result for selsh mining via a Monte
Carlo simulation. e aacker follows the selsh mining strategy
and it is assumed that, during a block race, the aacker’s block
always propagates to miners before the block of any other honest
miner. e gure shows the proportion of blocks on the main
chain won by aackers. e dashed line represents the proportion
that would be won by honest mining. For example, a selsh miner
with 40% of the mining power will claim about 66% of blocks with
Bitcoin and Ethereum currently; however, using Bobtail with k ≥ 5,
the same miner will nd that selsh mining is less successful than
honest mining.
9.2 Zero-cost Zero-conrmation (ZCZC)
Doublespend Attacks
Our approach to mitigating ZCZC doublespends is to simply with-
hold reward from the oending party. Suppose that proof set Pi
is associated with transaction set Ti , which contains T ′. Suppose
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Figure 6: Selfish mining aack success given k (dierent lines) for
various values of aacker mining power (on the independent axis).
The dashed line shows the results of honestmining. Error bars show
95% c.i.’s.
further that T1 contains T , a transaction incompatible with T ′. As
stipulated in Section 3, the miner assembling the block can include
bounty B(Ti ,T ′). We now further stipulate that both the primary
and bonus rewards nominally owed to Pi for this block shall in-
stead be awarded to P1. e implication of this policy is that it is
the miner of P1 who determines what is the correct transaction
when there exists an incompatibility. Note that, based on this ap-
proach, it becomes possible for the miner of P1 to intentionally
mine transactions incompatible with the other miners in order to
claim their reward. However, this strategy could only be protable
in the long-run if the miner possesses more than 50% of the hash
rate. Otherwise, the miner’s proofs will most oen be something
other than P1, in which case they will be the ones to lose reward.
9.3 Proof Withholding Attacks
Bobtail allows for an aack where a malicious miner withholds
proofs for a competitive advantage. In this section, we demon-
strate that our design of Bobtail ensures the economic rewards for
withholding aackers is substantially lower than that of honest
miners.
In the withholding aack, the malicious miner does not an-
nounce her own proofs to the other miners. is behavior can be
advantageous in two ways. First, it gives her more time to become
the 1OS, which means she controls the set of transactions included
in the block, T1. Second, it allows the aacker to pack more of her
own proofs into the proof package if she does manage to mine the
1OS. e aacker mines until either she is able to assemble a block
as author of the 1OS; or it is clear that the honest miners are more
likely to release a block without her withheld proofs. In the laer
case, she disseminates her withheld proofs, hoping that some will
be included in the proof package of the next block.
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Figure 7: All miners behave honestly. The dashed lines show the
predicted value of R and B from Eq. 13.
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Figure 8: Withholding by aackers results in greater rewards for
the honest miners. The dashed lines show the predicted value of R
and B from Eq. 13.
To thwart the aack, Bobtail includes two simple rules. First, it is
considered honest behavior forminers to prioritize inclusion of their
own proofs when assembling a block. Second, aer prioritizing
their own proofs, if multiple subsets of k proofs can be used to
assemble a block, an honest miner will select proofs from other
miners in the order that they were received locally over the network.
In other words, the proofs of the withholding aacker will be likely
le out if withheld too long.
We evaluated this aack using aMonte Carlo simulation. Figure 7
shows the allocation of rewards and bonuses when all miners act
honestly: they are precisely predicted by Eq. 13. Figure 8 shows
result of the withholding aack given the two rules described above.
Malicious behavior results in the aacking miner receiving lower
reward from proofs and bonuses than honest miners. is is because
the prot that she loses for releasing her proofs too late when she
does not mine the block is greater than the prot she gains by
withholding when she does. Furthermore, the rewards to honest
miners are actually greater because of the aack.
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9.4 Denial-of-Reward Attacks
In contrast to doublespend and selsh mining aacks, a denial-of-
reward (DoR) aack can be carried out by any network participant,
not just a miner. e aacker releases two incompatible transac-
tions T and T ′, each to disjoint subsets of the miners. e result
is that any proof Pi generated such that T ∈ Ti , will receive no
reward if P1 is generated such thatT ′ ∈ T1. In this way, the aacker
can lower the protability of mining for all or a subset of miners.
When network latency between miners is reasonably low, and
assuming that an eclipse aack [31] on miners is not possible,
DoR aacks can be rendered largely ineective. Even if half the
miners initially receive transaction T , while the other half receive
incompatible transaction T ′, all miners will receive both T and T ′
within seconds. In Bitcoin, the probability that one of the k lowest
OSes is mined within a time-period of a few seconds is very low. In
Ethereum, the probability would be much higher, but miners could
simply adopt a policy of waiting several seconds before beginning
to mine a newly received transaction.
With knowledge of the existence of T and T ′, the safest strategy
for miners is to exclude both. However, this practice can leave
an honest transaction creator stuck (who might have accidentally
submied two transactions spending the same UTXO) and also
prevents miners from collecting the associated fee. us, the best
approach is for miners to establish the following convention. If
T ′ is received more than a few seconds aer T , then discard T ′
and mine T exclusively. When T and T ′ are received within a few
seconds of each other, mine the transaction with the lowest hash
value if the fees are the same, otherwise mine the transaction with
the highest fee. Note that miners have ample incentive to follow
this convention because if they do not, then there is a good chance
that the proofs they mine will be incompatible with the 1OS, and
therefore will receive no reward.
10 CONCLUSION
Wehave designed and characterized a novel method of low-variance
blockchain mining. We have derived expressions for the expecta-
tion and variance of the Bobtail mining proof and the number of
hashes performed for any value of k . Using these expressions, we
have shown that Bobtail reduces variance by a factor of O(1/k),
compared to using k = 1. We have also shown that forks are cre-
ated by Bobtail miners no more oen than existing systems, and
that dishonest miners receive signicantly lower rewards due to
minor protocol adjustments. Furthermore, we have demonstrated
that low-variance mining signicantly reduces the eectiveness
of doublespend and selsh mining aacks, and that our design
thwarts withholding and denial-of-reward aacks. Finally we have
introduced a policy for proof dissemination that keeps network
trac to a minimum.
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A DISTRIBUTIONS OF MINING PROCESSES
Consider the distribution of H an arbitrary random variable chosen
from the sequence of block hashes H1, . . . ,Hh . We have fH (t ; S) =
1/S and FH (t ; S) = t/S . e following result is well known4.
LEMMA 1: e probability density function (pdf) of the ith
order statistic, Vi , from h samples (i.e., hashes) is
fVi (t ; S,h) = h!(i−1)!(h−i)! fH (t) (FH (t))i−1 (1 − FH (t))h−i
= h!(i−1)!(h−i)!
1
S
( t
S
)i−1 (1 − tS )h−i .
(14)
When hash interval I corresponds to the desired block time, say 10
minutes for Bitcoin, there will be many hashes performed during
the interval. So it is reasonable to consider how the distribution for
Vi changes in the limit that h approaches innity.
THEOREM 9: In the limit that h approaches innity, Vi ∼
Gamma(i,v) wherev is the expected value of the minimum hash.
PROOF: Dene д(t ; i,v) to be the PDF of the Gamma distribution
with shape parameter i and scale parameter v . If the number of
hashes approaches innity, then so must the size of the hash space,
and yet S must always be larger than h. erefore, we assume that
h = S/v for arbitrary parameter v > 1. Under this assumption we
can equivalently consider limit that S approaches innity. We have
fVi (t ; S,h) = limh→∞ fVi (t ; S,h)
= lim
S→∞
(S/v)!
(i−1)!
(
S
v −i
)
!
1
S
( t
S
)i−1 (1 − tS ) Sv −i
= lim
S→∞
(S/v)!
S i (i−1)!
(
S
v −i
)
!
t i−1
(
1 − tS
) S
v −i
= t
i−1
(i−1)!
[
lim
S→∞
(
S
v
)
...
(
S
v −i+1
)
S i
] [
lim
S→∞
(
1 − tS
) S
v −i
]
= t
i−1
(i−1)!v i e
−t
v
= д(t ; i,v),
(15)
e second to last step follows from the fact that
lim
S→∞
(
S
v
)
. . .
(
S
v − i + 1
)
Si
= lim
S→∞
(
S
v
)i
Si
=
1
vi
, (16)
and the common limit
lim
S→∞
(
1 − t
S
) S
v
= e
−v
v , (17)
4See for example, Casella and Berger [30]
which implies that
lim
S→∞
(
1 − t
S
) S
v −i
=
[
lim
S→∞
(
1 − t
S
)−i ] [
lim
S→∞
(
1 − t
S
) S
v
]
(18)
= 1 · e −tv . (19)
When i = 1, V1 ∼ Gamma(t ; 1,v) = Exponential(t ;v). And since
the expected value of an exponential random variable is equal to
the value of its scale parameter, we can see that v is simply the
expected value of the minimum hash. 2
Next, consider the PDF of Xi , fXi (x ; S,v). Aer x hash intervals,
let E, L, andG be, respectively, the events that the ith order statistic
is equal to v , the order statistics below i are less than v , and the
order statistics above i are greater than v . Furthermore, let O be
the set of all divisions of H1, . . . ,Hh into distinct sets {H | H = Vi },
{H | H < Vi }, and {H | H > Vi }. We have
fXi (x ; S,v) =
∑
o∈O
P[E(x),L(x),G(x) | o]
fXi (x ; S,v) =
(hx
i−1
)(hx − i + 1)P[E(x) | o]P[L(x) | o]P[G(x) | o]
fXi (x ; S,v) = (hx )!(i−1)!(hx−i)!P[E(x) | o]P[L(x) | o]P[G(x) | o]
fXi (x ; S,v) = (hx )!(i−1)!(hx−i)! 1S
(v
S
)i−1 (1 − vS )hx−i
(20)
Assuming that I is large, it again makes sense to consider the
limit as h approaches innity.
THEOREM 10: In the limit that h approaches innity, Xi ∼
Gamma(i, 1/r ) where r is the expected number of hashes falling
below v during a given interval.
PROOF: e probability that any given hash succeeds, i.e. falls
below v , is given by p = vS . Again, we would like to consider the
limit as h approaches innity. But in doing so, we must ensure that
the probability of hash success remains constant. In other words,
the probability of hash success must diminish as h increases. So
there must exist some constant r such that rh = p =
v
S . It follows
that
fXi (x ; S,v) = (hx )!(i−1)!(hx−i)! rh
(
r
h
)i−1 (
1 − rh
)hx−i (21)
Arguing in similar fashion as for Vi , we nd that
lim
h→∞
fXi (x ; S,v) = д(x ; i, 1/r ).
us, E[Xi ] = 1/r , which implies that r should be interpreted as the
expected rate at which hashes fall below v during a single interval
I. 2
We can see that the distributions forVi andXi are related through
the change of variables v = 1/r , and all four parameters v , r , h, and
S are related by
v = r
S
h
.
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In words, the laer states: the expected value of the minimum hash
is related to the expected number of blocks mined per interval by
the ratio Sh .
A.1 Joint Distributions
THEOREM 11: e joint distribution of the ith and jth order
statistic of uniform random samples H1, . . . ,Hh is given by
fVi ,Vj (ti , tj ;v) = д(ti ; i,v)д(tj − ti ; j − i,v). (22)
where v is the expected value of the minimum hash.
PROOF: It is well known5 that the joint distribution of the ith and
jth order statistics, out of h total samples, is given by
fVi ,Vj (ti , tj ;v) = h!(i−1)!(j−1−i)!(h−j)! fH (ti )fH (tj )[FH (ti )]i−1
× [FH (tj ) − FH (ti )]j−1−i [1 − FH (tj )]n−j . (23)
us, we have
fVi ,Vj (ti , tj ; S,v) =
t i−1i (tj−ti )j−1−i
S j
h!
(i−1)!(j−1−i)!(h−j)!
(
1 − tjS
)h−j
=
S
v ...
(
S
v −j+1
)
S j
t i−1i (tj−ti )j−1−i
(i−1)!(j−1−i)!
(
1 − tjS
) S
v −j
.
(24)
Finally, assuming j > i , and reasoning in the limit as S →∞ in the
same manner as above,
fVi ,Vj (ti , tj ;v) = limS→∞ fVi ,Vj (ti , tj ; S,v)
= 1v j
t i−1i (tj−ti )j−1−i
(i−1)!(j−1−i)! e
− tjv
=
t i−1i
v i (i−1)!e
− tiv (tj−ti )
j−1−i
v j−i (j−1−i)!e
− tj −tiv
= д(ti ; i,v)д(tj − ti ; j − i,v).
(25)
2
Because Xi shares the same distribution as Vi , up to the change
of variables v = 1/r , the following result follows trivially.
THEOREM 12: e joint distribution of Xi and X j , j > i , is
given by
fXi ,X j (ti , tj ; 1/r ) = д(ti ; i, 1/r )д(tj − ti ; j − i, 1/r ). (26)
where r is the expected rate at which hashes fall belowv during
a single interval I.
B MOMENTS OFWK
e goal of this section is to empirically validate our expression for
E[Wk ] from Section 5 and then derive and validate an expression
for Var [Wk ]. Wk is simply the sample mean over the lowest k
order statistics V1, . . . ,Vk . But, unfortunately, the analysis below
is not straightforward because the Vi are neither independent nor
identically distributed.
Empirical Validation of eorem 2. Figure 9 compares Eq. 4
versus a result obtained through a small Monte Carlo simulation
5See Casella and Berger [30], eorem 5.4.6.
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Figure 9: Eq. 4 versus simulation.
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Figure 10: Eq. 27 versus simulation.
of Bobtail mining run tens of thousands of times, with k as the
independent variable. In all cases, the results match perfectly.
B.1 Variance ofWk
THEOREM 13: e variance ofWk is
Var [Wk ] =
(k + 1)(2k + 1)
6k v
2. (27)
PROOF: Assuming that j > i , eorem 11 yields
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E[ViVj ] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
ti
ti tjд(ti ; i,v)д(tj − ti ; j − i,v)dtjdti
=
∫ ∞
0 tiд(ti ; i,v)
∫ ∞
0 (w + ti )д(w ; j − i,v)dwdti
=
∫ ∞
0 tiд(ti ; i,v)[(j − i)v + ti ]dti
= v(j − i)
∫ ∞
0 tiд(ti ; i,v)dti +
∫ ∞
0 t
2
i д(ti ; i,v)dti
= iv2(j − i) + iv2(1 + i)
= iv2(1 + j). (28)
Before continuing, we note that since Vi ∼ Gamma(i,v), it follows
that Var [Vi ] = iv2. Now, assuming that j > i , and using Eq. 28, we
have
cov[Vi ,Vj ] = E[ViVj ] − E[Vi ]E[Vj ]
= iv2(1 + j) − (iv)(jv)
= iv2
= Var [Vi ].
(29)
Finally, we nd the variance ofWk by substituting rst Eq. 1 and
then Eq. 29:
Var [Wk ] = Var
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
Vi
]
= 1k2Var
[
k∑
i=1
Vi
]
= 1k2
(
k∑
i=1
Var [Vi ] + 2
k∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
cov[Vi ,Vj ]
)
= 1k2
(
k∑
i=1
iv2 + 2
k∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
iv2
)
= v
2
k2
(
k (k+1)
2 +
k∑
j=1
j(j − 1)
)
= v
2
k2
(
k (k+1)
2 +
k (k+1)(2k+1)
6 − k (k+1)2
)
=
(k+1)(2k+1)
6k v
2.
(30)
2
Empirical Validation of eorem 13. Figure 10 shows Eq. 27
versus our Monte Carlo simulation where k is the independent
variable. e results show an exact match.
Because Xi shares the same distribution as Vi , up to the change
of variables v = 1/r , the following result follows trivially.
THEOREM 14:
Var
[
1
k
k∑
i=1
Xi
]
=
(k + 1)(2k + 1)
6k
(
1
r
)2
. (31)
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Figure 11: Eq. 10 from Theorem 5 (in blue) versus simulation (in
red).
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